Explaining the Spread of Law Firm in-House Counsel Positions: A Response to Professor Chambliss by Gorman, Elizabeth H.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 84
Number 5 Empirical Studies of the Legal Profession:
What Do We Know About Lawyers' Lives?
Article 8
6-1-2006
Explaining the Spread of Law Firm in-House
Counsel Positions: A Response to Professor
Chambliss
Elizabeth H. Gorman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North
Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth H. Gorman, Explaining the Spread of Law Firm in-House Counsel Positions: A Response to Professor Chambliss, 84 N.C. L. Rev.
1577 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol84/iss5/8
EXPLAINING THE SPREAD OF LAW FIRM
IN-HOUSE COUNSEL POSITIONS:
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR CHAMBLISS
ELIZABETH H. GORMAN*
In recent years, a growing number of large law firms have
established a position of in-house general counsel to the firm. In
her article for this Symposium, Professor Elizabeth Chambliss
analyzes qualitative empirical data to show how the lawyers who fill
these positions conceptualize their roles, their authority, and their
ethical duties. In this Response, I ask why law firms are
increasingly establishing these roles. I examine three explanations
for the spread of firm counsel positions among law firms: a
rational explanation centering on the efficiency of bureaucratic
organization; an institutional explanation highlighting the spread of
practices already institutionalized among firms' corporate clients;
and a broader cultural explanation focusing on the changing
conception of ethics within the legal profession. The Response
concludes by suggesting that the profession may be moving from a
self-regulatory regime centered on ethics to a regime of market
discipline based on disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a growing number of large law firms have
established a position of in-house general counsel to the firm. The
nature and scope of these positions vary across firms and appear to be
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Virginia.
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evolving over time within firms.1 Firm counsel jobs may be full-time
or part-time. Work done on behalf of the firm may or may not be
directly compensated, and compensation may take a variety of forms.
Lawyers who fill these positions may or may not also represent
external clients; they may be firm partners or hold a senior non-
partner title; they may be hired from within the firm or from outside.
Substantively, the work of firm counsel varies across firms, but it
tends to emphasize the regulation of legal practice under professional
rules of ethics, regulatory legislation, and malpractice law. Their
responsibilities also increasingly extend to employment and insurance
issues, supplier contracts, fee disputes with clients, and firm mergers.
In her article for this Symposium, Professor Elizabeth Chambliss
marshals data from focus group discussions and interviews with firm
counsel to provide a most interesting glimpse into how the lawyers
who fill these positions conceptualize their roles, their authority, and
their ethical duties.
Why are law firms increasingly establishing firm counsel
positions? The "common sense" answer is that law firms' needs for
legal advice and representation have grown as the regulations
governing lawyers have become more complex and clients and other
parties have become more willing to take legal action against firms.
For example, a law firm consultant explained the spread of firm
counsel positions this way: "More and more firms are instituting the
role of general counsel in response to a business climate that demands
more accountability and better risk management."2 This "common
sense" explanation is a lay version of what social scientists call a
"functional" explanation. The firm counsel position represents a
structure-a way of structuring or organizing work and an aspect of
the overall formal structure of the firm. A functional explanation of
organizational structure takes the following form: organizations need
to have a particular function performed (in this case, legal services)
and so they create a structure to perform it (in this case, the firm
counsel position).3 A common problem with functional explanations,
1. See Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44
ARIz. L. REV. 559, 565 (2002); Nancy Rubin Stuart, A Lawyer's Lawyer: More Firms
Establish In-House General Counsel Positions, 180 N.J. L.J 1091, 1091 (2005); Jeff
Blumenthal, Survey: More Firms Using Their Own GC, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 1,
2005; Leigh Jones, More Firms Hire General Counsel: GCs Help Reduce the Risk of
Liability, NAT'L L.J., June 6, 2005, at 1.
2. Stuart, supra note 1, at 1091.
3. See ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, CONSTRUCTING SOCIAL THEORIES 80-101
(1968).
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however, is that several alternative structures could perform the
necessary function. Function alone cannot explain why organizations
choose a particular structure. For example, a law firm could deal with
the need for "more accountability and better risk management" by
hiring outside counsel or by allocating firm work among several of the
firm's existing lawyers.
In this Response, I examine three additional explanations for the
spread of firm counsel positions among law firms: a rational
explanation centering on the efficiency of bureaucratic organization;
an institutional explanation highlighting the spread of practices
already institutionalized among firms' corporate clients; and a
broader cultural explanation focusing on the changing
conceptualization of ethics within the legal profession. These are not
necessarily competing theories; in fact, it is likely that each of them
represents part of the story. I conclude with some thoughts about the
implications of firm counsel positions and related developments for
the regulation of the legal profession, and suggest that the profession
may be moving from a self-regulatory regime centered on ethics to a
regime of market discipline based on disclosure.
I. THE RATIONAL EXPLANATION: THE EFFICIENCY OF
BUREAUCRACY
The rational explanation is actually a variant of the functional
explanation, but it adds the element of efficiency. According to the
rational view, organizations establish particular structures because
such structures are the optimal ways of performing particular
functions. Law firms establish firm counsel positions, then, because
such positions provide greater net benefits than do other alternatives.
The relatively high benefits and low costs of firm counsel positions
derive from their bureaucratic nature.
In Max Weber's classic definition, bureaucracy is distinguished
by a division of labor in which tasks are grouped into clearly defined
and stable positions or "offices," and by a hierarchy of command in
which each office is supervised by a single higher office.4 Both the
compensation and the authority of the officeholder derive from the
performance of official duties, and not from other activities or
personal characteristics. Officeholders devote their full time to their
jobs, are selected on the basis of knowledge and competence, and
work within constraints imposed by formal rules. Weber argued that
4. Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS: BASIC
STUDIES 7, 7-36 (Oscar Grusky & George A. Miller eds., 2d ed. 1981).
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bureaucracy is technically superior to any other form of organization,
including patrimonial and collegial forms based on personal status or
relationships. In bureaucratic administration, "[p]recision, speed,
unambiguity, [and] knowledge of the files ... are raised to the
optimum point. ' 5 Moreover, despite the costs of hiring specialized
personnel, bureaucracy is less costly than other structures because it
avoids delays, incompetence, and friction among competing interests.
6
Since Weber wrote, organizational scholars have concluded that
the costs and benefits of bureaucracy vary with the characteristics of
organizations and their environments; thus, bureaucracy may be
optimal under some circumstances but not others. Two important
contingency factors are the extent to which an organization's work is
technical or routine (rather than calling for complex reasoning and
judgment) and the organization's size.7 Increasingly, law firm work
and size are changing in ways that should favor the adoption of
bureaucratic structures, at least at certain levels or in certain segments
of firms.8 Several factors make it increasingly costly for law firms to
avoid a fixed division of labor based on special expertise. Tasks that
are not strictly legal in nature, such as firm management, marketing,
and human resources, are becoming increasingly complex and time-
consuming. Within legal practice itself, the sheer amount of law is
growing.9 More and more of the law governing the activities of
business clients consists of detailed regulations that call for technical
5. Id. at 19.
6. Id. at 20.
7. See, e.g., Peter M. Blau, A Formal Theory of Differentiation in Organizations, 35
AM. SOC. REV. 201, 201-18 (1970) (arguing that increasing organizational size generates
organizational differentiation, based on analysis of data on government agencies); Jerald
Hage & Michael Aiken, Routine Technology, Social Structure, and Organizational Goals,
14 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 366, 370-73 (1969) (finding that the routineness of work is associated
with centralization and formalization in social service organizations); Charles Perrow, A
Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Organizations, 32 AM. Soc. REV. 194 passim
(1967) (theorizing that the variability and analyzability of work tasks determine
organizational structure).
8. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 49-50, 77-87 (1991) (describing firms'
weakening ties to clients and rapid growth); MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER
LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN
SOCIETY 6-7, 31 (1994) (describing law firms' increasing emphasis on financial success);
ROBERT NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM 57-59 (1988) (describing firms' increasingly competitive business
environment); Elizabeth Gorman, Moving Away from "Up or Out": Determinants of
Permanent Employment in Law Firms, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 637, 639-42 (1999)
(describing changes in law firms' work, client relationships, and culture).
9. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 8, at 41-42 (describing the dramatic
increase in regulations and court and agency decisions).
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expertise rather than generalized analytical skill or legal judgment.
Corporate clients, who typically maintain in-house legal staffs, now
turn to firms primarily for matters that call for highly specialized
skills.1" While the division of labor is growing finer, increasing firm
size-now up to thousands of lawyers-is making it more and more
difficult to coordinate the work of specialized lawyers through
personal ties.
As the rational perspective would predict, law firms are moving
toward increased bureaucratization." Overall, roles are becoming
more specialized by type of task, and a clearer hierarchy of authority
is developing.12 Compensation is increasingly tied to performance,
firms are more willing to fill jobs from outside the firm based on skill,
and firm work is increasingly governed by standard procedures and
rules. The spread of firm counsel positions can be seen as part of this
trend. Of course, as Professor Chambliss points out, the
bureaucratization of the firm counsel role is not complete. Many firm
counsel perform the role on a part-time basis while they maintain an
outside practice; many come from the partnership ranks and have
long-standing personal loyalties to the firm and other partners; and
many feel that their authority stems from their outside practice or
their personal ties, rather than from their positional authority as firm
counsel.13 Still, the firm counsel role has a fixed "jurisdiction" limited
to matters involving the firm. It is subject to the hierarchical
authority of firm management. As time passes, it is increasingly
marked by full-time work, direct compensation, outside hiring, and
formal rules.
Is efficiency the reason why firms are establishing bureaucratic
firm counsel positions? It might be possible to test the rational
explanation by examining whether the use of firm counsel varies with
firms' mix of practice areas. If work on behalf of a firm calls for
10. See GLENDON, supra note 8, at 34 (stating that corporate clients turn to outside
firms primarily for specialized expertise); ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
THE FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 276,284 (1993) (same); NELSON, supra
note 8, at 61 (describing corporations' increasing reliance on in-house legal departments).
11. E.g., GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 8, at 48-49 (discussing large law firms'
tendency toward bureaucratic organization and management); NELSON, supra note 8, at
147-50 (same); Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Framework for Law Firm
Discipline, GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 335, 347 (2003) (noting a general trend toward the
centralization and specialization of law firm management).
12. One aspect of this evolution toward specialized roles is firms' increasing use of
permanent non-partnership-track positions, which often focus on narrow or technical
areas of law. See Gorman, supra note 8, at 637.
13. Elizabeth Chambliss, The Professionalization of Law Firm In-House Counsel, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1515, 1549-50, 1555 (2006).
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expertise different from that of most firm partners, assigning firm
work to existing partners on a piecemeal basis is more costly. 4
Although all firm counsel deal with matters of professional
responsibility and legal malpractice, they also often handle issues in
areas that are not unique to law firms, such as employment,
insurance, or supplier contracts. Firms that handle such matters as
part of their client practices should be less likely to establish a firm
counsel position than those that do not-boutique firms specializing
in intellectual property or environmental law, for example-because
they can efficiently meet the firm's own legal needs through reliance
on firm lawyers who practice in those areas.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATION: APPLYING A LEGITIMIZED
TEMPLATE
An alternative explanation for the emergence of the firm counsel
position is that law firms are imitating a practice that has become
institutionalized among business corporations. Organizational
structures or practices become institutionalized when they are taken
for granted as the way things are done by a certain type of
organization.15 Institutionalized structures have two hallmarks. First,
people find it difficult to imagine another way of doing things.
Second, if they can imagine another way, it seems suspect and not
what a legitimate organization of the relevant type would do. Law
schools, for example, are full of institutionalized structures and
practices. 6  Consider how nearly uniform the structure and
curriculum of law schools are across the United States, and how little
they have changed over the last several decades. It requires real
mental effort to imagine how a law school could be different. To the
extent that any law school implemented major changes that might be
efficient-for example, shortening the program of study to two
years-that law school would likely be seen as illegitimate.
14. One legal recruiter appeared to recognize this point, saying that firms were likely
to establish firm counsel jobs when they realized "that you can't fill your own teeth....
It's better to get somebody whose full-time job it is to worry about cavities." Jones, supra
note 1, at 17.
15. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, Introduction to THE NEW
INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 1, 1-40 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J.
DiMaggio eds., 1991); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized Organizations:
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340,340-63 (1977).
16. Educational institutions in general make extensive use of institutionalized
practices. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 14, at 354; Brian Rowan, Organizational
Structure and the Institutional Environment: The Case of Public Schools, 27 ADMIN. SCI.
Q. 259, 260 (1982).
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According to institutional theorists, institutionalized structures
are most likely to emerge and remain in place in situations where
there are no clear criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of different
possible organizational structures, and thus no rational way of
deciding between them.17 Typically, an institutionalized structure
begins as an innovation introduced by a small number of
organizations of a particular type or in a particular industry. The
innovation is usually intended as a rational effort to gain an
advantage or solve a problem. If the first-mover organizations do not
go out of business and their innovation has appeal, other similar
organizations try it. The more organizations adopt the innovation,
the more legitimacy it gains. Eventually, it becomes taken for granted
as the thing to do, and organizations adopt it regardless of whether or
not it appears to serve any rational purpose for them.18 Organizations
engage in what DiMaggio and Powell call "mimetic isomorphism"-
they unthinkingly imitate what everyone else seems to be doing.1"
Once a structure has become institutionalized in one industry or type
of organization, it can jump to another. People are cognitively
capable of creating a mental template of the structure, abstracting it
from its original setting, and transposing it in a new one.20 The
structure can then become institutionalized in the new context as
well.
This model seems to fit the spread of firm counsel positions. In-
house counsel positions have been common among large business
corporations for some thirty to forty years, and are clearly
institutionalized in that setting.21 As large law firms have grown in
17. See Meyer & Rowan, supra note 14, at 355-59.
18. For example, empirical research has shown that during the twentieth century cities
initially adopted civil service reform in response to local needs, but later adopters did so
regardless of local characteristics. Pamela S. Tolbert & Lynn G. Zucker, Institutional
Sources of Change in the Formal Structure of Organizations: The Diffusion of Civil Service
Reform, 1880-1935, 28 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 22, 33-35 (1983). Other research has shown that
corporations' decisions to adopt multidivisional structures were influenced by the rate of
adoption by other firms in their industries. Neil Fligstein, The Spread of the
Multidivisional Form Among Large Firms, 1919-1979, 50 AM. SOC. REV. 377, 387-88
(1985).
19. Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147, 151-52 (1983).
20. See William H. Sewell, Jr., A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and
Transformation, 98 AM. J. SOC. 1, 17-18 (1992).
21. From the 1960s through the 1980s, corporate legal staffs grew rapidly. See EVE
SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 70-106 (1986);
Nick Gallucio, The Rise of the Company Lawyer, FORBES, Sept. 18, 1978, at 168, 168. In
most large corporations, in-house lawyers have long assumed the function of general
counsel, while outside firms increasingly focus on the provision of specialized services on a
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size and scope, and as the professional culture that prevailed in the
middle of the twentieth century has broken down, firms have
increasingly come to think of themselves as business organizations."z
Templates for the structure of a business organization are readily
available to law firms in the corporate clients they serve. Reports in
the legal press suggest that firms have deliberately imitated corporate
structural models.23  As firm counsel positions become more
legitimate and institutionalized, it may become the case that any firm
that wants to be seen as a serious player will have to have one. If
institutional processes are indeed operating, we can expect that over
time the characteristics of the firm counsel role will become
increasingly standardized across law firms and will increasingly
coalesce around the corporate model.
III. THE CULTURAL EXPLANATION: CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Both the rational and institutional explanations for the spread of
firm counsel positions largely accept the premise that firms need legal
services, and focus on explaining why firms adopt a particular
structure-the firm counsel position-to perform that function. A
third approach-which is compatible with the other two-focuses on
the changes in firms' cultural environments that have led them to feel
a need for legal services in the first place. In this connection, it is
important that most firm counsel spend much of their time on matters
relating to the professional conduct of firm attorneys.24 It is not
immediately obvious that these issues create a need for legal services
at all, whether structured in the form of a firm counsel position or
otherwise. Thus, an underlying cause of the emergence and spread of
firm counsel positions is a change in the legal profession's culturally
case-by-case basis. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 8, at 49-50; SPANGLER, supra,
at 100; Abram Chayes & Antonia Chayes, Corporate Counsel and the Elite Law Firm, 37
STAN. L. REV. 277, 277-78 (1985); Robert Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change
and the Structure of Large Law Firms, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 95, 130. The role of in-
house counsel has continued to grow in importance as the law has become an increasingly
salient feature of the business environment. See Robert Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen,
Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large
Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 457,459 (2000).
22. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 8, at 68; GLENDON, supra note 8, at 6-7, 31;
KRONMAN, supra note 10, at 291.
23. For example, the Legal Intelligencer argued that "as larger firms move toward a
corporate business model, specialization becomes more prominent. If firms have chief
marketing, finance and operating officers, why not have a chief legal officer?" Blumenthal,
supra note L
24. See supra note 1.
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shared understanding of the regulation of professional conduct. We
might call this a cultural explanation.25
In the classic model of the professions, the culture of the
professional community is itself the principal means of regulation of
professional conduct.26 Shared values and corresponding norms of
behavior develop and are sustained informally through interaction
and consensus. Although the details of these norms vary across
professions, their substance focuses on restraining professionals from
taking advantage of their specialized knowledge to the detriment of
individuals who lack that knowledge and thus cannot easily evaluate a
professional's conduct. Professional norms especially emphasize the
protection of clients, who are necessarily placed in a position of
dependence on the professional and must trust that professional not
to abuse his or her power.27
Individual professionals are brought into conformity with this
culture through two mechanisms: socialization and peer control.
Through socialization early in their careers, professionals internalize
their profession's values and norms.28 First, professionals develop a
conception of what "most people" in the profession think-an image
of the "generalized other" in the professional community-that
operates as a kind of internal police and constrains their behavior.
Second, because people generally minimize psychological dissonance
by converting constraints into preferences, most professionals come
to endorse the dominant values and norms. Professionals then
reward or sanction their own behavior with feelings of self-approval
or self-disapproval and correspondingly high or low self-esteem. Peer
control operates as a kind of back-up mechanism. When other
members of the professional community discover that one of their
25. Of course, the institutional explanation is also a cultural explanation, but one that
is focused more narrowly on a particular institutionalized practice.
26. See William J. Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 22 AM.
Soc. REV. 194, 196-98 (1957) (arguing that the larger society allows professional
autonomy because professional communities undertake to socialize and control their
members).
27. Thus, according to the American Medical Association, one of the central
principles of medical ethics holds that "[a] physician shall, while caring for a patient,
regard responsibility to the patient as paramount." AM. MED. ASSN, PRINCIPLES OF
MEDICAL ETHICS, Principle VIII (2001), available at http://wwwv.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/
category/2512.html. In the legal profession, the first and largest section of the American
Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct deals with the lawyer-client
relationship. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-.18 (2003).
28. Goode, supra note 26, at 196 (discussing processes of socialization); W. Richard
Scott, Professionals in Bureaucracies-Areas of Conflict, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 265,
265-67 (Howard Vollmer & Donald Mills eds., 1966) (contrasting professional self-control
with external bureaucratic control).
2006] 1585
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
peers has violated the community's norms of professional conduct,
they apply the social sanctions of disapproval and ostracism. In
practice, however, peer control is often quite weak. Peer control
itself runs counter to one of the central values of any profession-
professional autonomy. As a result, professionals tend to resist
efforts to establish structures for systematically observing or
punishing improper behavior.29 Moreover, peer control depends
upon effective socialization. Social sanctions are only effective for
individuals who are sufficiently integrated into their professional
communities to care about what their peers think of them." Thus, the
regulation of professional conduct occurs primarily through self-
regulation by individual professionals.
This classic model of individual self-control, backed up by peer
control, is what we traditionally mean by "professional ethics." The
very term "ethics" calls to mind the idea of internal standards of
proper and moral behavior that individuals apply to themselves,
rewarding themselves with an internal sense of honor. However, the
fit between the classic model of professional self-control and reality
has been worsening across all the professions, including law, for some
time.3" There are many reasons for this change, but perhaps the
central factor is the gradual disintegration of well-defined, coherent
professional communities that are able to sustain their own
independent cultures.32 Bar associations, like other professional
associations, have responded by elaborating more and more extensive
formal codes of ethics.33 In addition, government regulation of
lawyers is growing in a piecemeal fashion ancillary to regulation of
lawyers' clients.34 As a result, the meaning of the term "ethics" for
lawyers has gradually shifted from an emphasis on internally held
morality to an emphasis on externally imposed rules.35
29. See Eliot Freidson & Buford Rhea, Processes of Control in a Company of Equals,
11 SOC. PROBS. 119, 124-29 (1963) (analyzing and interpreting evidence of weak peer
control among physicians).
30. See id. at 129.
31. See Eliot Freidson, The Changing Nature of Professional Control, 10 ANN. REV.
Soc. 1, 3 (1984).
32. Law firms' imitation of institutionalized corporate structures is one example of the
legal profession's current cultural permeability.
33. See Elizabeth Chambliss, The Scope of In-Firm Privilege, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1721, 1756-57 (2005); Freidson, supra note 31, at 13-19.
34. Chambliss, supra note 33, at 1757.
35. See Mark Suchman, Working Without a Net: The Sociology of Legal Ethics in
Corporate Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 837, 842-43 (1998). The two
conceptualizations of ethics-as internal virtue and as external rules-are not inherently
incompatible, and can, in theory, exist side by side. However, the social supports for the
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This shift in the conceptualization of ethics has profound
implications for law firms' perception of a need for legal services. If
"ethics" denotes internal ideals toward which each lawyer should
strive, then ethical issues do not create a need for legal counsel. What
law firms might need, in that case, is the equivalent of a chaplain-
someone to provide advice on murky issues of right and wrong and
coaching in how to resist temptations to behave unethically. But if
ethics are externally imposed requirements that carry, at least
potentially, externally imposed penalties for their violation, they have
become analogous to other legal requirements. The lawyer's concern
then shifts from trying to be virtuous to trying to avoid liability. In
this context, ethical issues clearly do create a need for legal advice.
Without this shift in the nature and meaning of professional ethics,
the question of how firms should structure the provision of legal
advice-by establishing firm counsel positions or otherwise-
probably would not arise.
IV. FROM ETHICS TO DISCLOSURE?
All three of the theories discussed above lead to the prediction
that firm in-house general counsel positions are likely to become
increasingly common. The rational view and the institutional view
suggest that firm counsel positions will increasingly mirror the
bureaucratic corporate model. The institutional perspective also
suggests that these positions will become increasingly standardized
across large firms, regardless of their particular characteristics. The
emergence of firm counsel and the attendant shift from internalized
to externally-imposed professional ethics raise another issue,
however. If lawyers are no longer concerned with meeting
internalized moral expectations, and if firm counsel are primarily
concerned with ensuring that their firms avoid liability, who, if
anyone, will restrain opportunistic behavior by large firms and their
lawyers? Although ethical codes have been formalized and
elaborated, their actual enforcement is relatively infrequent. When it
does happen, it is usually directed toward sole and small-firm
practitioners with a retail clientele, not toward the larger firms that
are more likely to employ in-house firm counsel.
3 6
first understanding have largely faded away, and its consequent weakening has spurred the
development of the second.
36. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 6-
7 (1991).
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In the case of large firms with corporate clients, it seems likely
that clients themselves will increasingly control lawyers' conduct
through the discipline of the market. In the classic professional
model, codes of ethics were largely intended to level the playing field
between clients and lawyers by preventing lawyers from unfairly
using their specialized knowledge to their own advantage at clients'
expense. That made sense when most clients were individuals or
small businesses. Today's clients are much more sophisticated. They
are national or global corporations with extensive experience in
complex transactions and advanced capabilities to evaluate risk.
Even more important, with the advent and growth of in-house
corporate counsel staffs, the individuals involved in purchasing
outside legal services are generally lawyers themselves. Because
corporate clients have more or less the same knowledge that lawyers
have, they can monitor and evaluate the legal services they receive.
Essentially, they can protect themselves.
That is, they can protect themselves as long as they receive
adequate information. It is possible, then, that the segment of the bar
that serves corporate clients will find itself under pressure to shift
from a logic of self-control through professional ethics to a logic of
enabling clients to make their own decisions based on the disclosure
of relevant information. Under a disclosure regime, law firms would
presumably be required to provide specific information concerning
their policies, practices, and past performance to potential clients and
regulating bodies. Areas covered could conceivably include, among
other things, time billing practices and fee calculation, past
representations creating a potential for conflict of interest, and past
success rate in litigation.
This alternative logic is not new. A regime of disclosure, rather
than a regime of professional ethics, currently governs finance
professionals such as securities dealers and investment advisors.
Thus, the web site for the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") announces, "We believe that the most potent form of
investor protection is investor education."37 In response to concerns
that hedge fund managers may be fleecing investors, the Securities
and Exchange Commission has implemented additional disclosure
requirements, rather than disciplining fund managers for
unprofessional conduct.38 Disclosure requirements can be imposed by
37. Nat'l Ass'n of Securities Dealers, http://www.nasd.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
38. See David F. Swensen, Invest at Your Own Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2005, at
A21. Interestingly, although Swensen feels that disclosure requirements are inadequate to
protect most investors, he does not advocate the development of a system of professional
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professional associations on their members, as they are by the NASD,
as well as by government agencies. Nevertheless, under the logic of
disclosure it is clients, not professionals, who ultimately evaluate
professionals' performance.3 9
A disclosure regime would necessarily create responsibilities at
the firm level, rather than at the level of the individual lawyer. Firms,
not individual lawyers, would need to compile the relevant
information and present it to its designated recipients. Firms would
therefore need to establish ongoing firm-wide systems for collecting
information. Although such systems might well come under the
ultimate supervision of the firm counsel, they would likely be
maintained on a day-to-day basis by nonlawyer compliance
specialists. Thus, a disclosure regime would bring about the
development of a firm "infrastructure"-not exactly the "ethical
infrastructure" that Professor Chambliss and others have called for,4°
but still an infrastructure that might be equally--or more-effective
at protecting clients.41
ethics for hedge fund managers. Id. Instead, he argues that only the most savvy
institutional investors should be allowed to invest in hedge funds. Id.
39. Of course, disclosure requirements are not incompatible with codes of ethics. In a
world in which clients were empowered to monitor and assess their lawyers' conduct,
however, the need for such codes would be reduced.
40. Chambliss & Wilkins, supra note 11, at 342; Elizabeth Chambliss & David B.
Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for
Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 716 (2002); Schneyer, supra note 36, at
17-20, 23.
41. A disclosure regime would presumably be less relevant for the protection of
parties other than clients. Such parties do not stand in a relationship of trust with a
lawyer, however, and a lawyer's conduct with respect to them is likely to be governed by
the same laws that apply to all persons (rules barring fraudulent conduct or insider
trading, for example).
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